JEFAS Vol. 18 Nº 35 (2013)
URI permanente para esta colecciónhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12640/4122
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Ítem Solo Metadatos Institutional investors, corporate governance, and earnings management around merger: Evidence from French absorbing firms(Universidad ESAN. ESAN Ediciones, 2013-12-30) Njah, Mouna; Jarboui, AnisThis paper examines the association between institutional ownership and the earnings management beha-vior of some French absorbing firms. Using a sample of 76 French mergers and absorptions concluded over the period ranging from 2000 to 2010, we undertake to present some empirical evidence highlighting that absorbing-firms manipulate earnings relevant to the year preceding the merger-offer in the presence of institutional cross-holding. However, the presence of active institutions turns out to limit the managerial accruals discretion. The monitoring role exerted by the active-institutional investors does restrict the oppor-tunities of earnings management around mergers and acquisitions. Further analyses suggest that the average value of discretionary accruals with regards to the absorbing firms proves to be influenced by the nature of merger deal (takeover vs. restructuring).Ítem Solo Metadatos Adoption determinants of the International Accounting Standards IAS/IFRS by the developing countries(Universidad ESAN. ESAN Ediciones, 2013-12-30) Zehri, Fatma; Chouaibi, JamelThis paper’s main objective is to identify certain explanatory factors that likely clarify the choice of applying IAS/IFRS adopted by developing countries (DCs) up until the year 2008. Based on a sample consisting of 74 DCs the empirical results have indicated that the DCs most likely to adopt IAS/IFRS have a high level of economic growth along with a legal system of common law and an advanced educational level.Ítem Solo Metadatos Are over-paid Chief Executive Officers better innovators?(Universidad ESAN. ESAN Ediciones, 2013-12-30) Jouber, HabibThis paper focuses on the pay level of the highest paid executive directors which we label as “Executive Director’s Organizational Level” (henceforth EDOL) to raise the question if highest paid CEOs invest heavily in innovative projects. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions show that over-paid CEOs are more likely to invest in R y D projects. They highlight moreover both from a “statutory” and an “activist” perspective that CEOs’ intends to invest in value-enhancing innovations are contingent upon compensation committee independence and investor protection level. Check tests reveal that the pay-performance “innovation” effect for option-based compensation is higher than that for stock-based compensation. Within the options (stocks) rewards unvested options (restricted stocks) are the most effective. However we find that over-paid CEOs of low-growth firms achieve less innovation compared to those of high-growth firms. Throughout we reveal that the effect of CEOs performance-pay on innovation is mainly relevant among overconfident managers than non-overconfident ones.
