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dc.contributor.authorEscrihuela-Villar, Marc
dc.contributor.authorGuillén, Jorge
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-30T16:58:03Z
dc.date.available2021-09-30T16:58:03Z
dc.date.issued2015-11-09
dc.identifier.citationEscrihuela-Villar, M., & Guillén, J. (2011). On collusion sustainability with stacked reversion. Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, 24(2), 89–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677x.2011.11517458
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12640/2472
dc.description.abstractWe consider a multi-period oligopoly model to analyze cartel sustainability where a subset of collusive firms is exogenously given. We assume that in case of cheating only the cheater is expelled from the cartel and collusion continues without the cheater. We show that, in our model, when firms compete in quantities and the cartel is sufficiently small, a Stackelberg leader cartel can always be sustained if firms are patient enough. Furthermore, in this case collusion is more easily sustained than when firms play grim trigger strategies. The opposite result is obtained in a price-setting supergame with differentiated products.en_EN
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.publisherJuraj Dobrila University of Pulaes_ES
dc.relation.ispartofurn:issn: 1331-677X
dc.relation.ispartofurn:issn:1848-9664
dc.relation.urihttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1331677X.2011.11517458?needAccess=true
dc.rightsAttribution 3.0 Unported*
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_ES
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
dc.subjectCollusionen_EN
dc.subjectStacked reversionen_EN
dc.subjectTrigger strategiesen_EN
dc.titleOn collusion sustainability with stacked reversiones_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees_ES
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1080/1331677x.2011.11517458
dc.publisher.countryHRes_ES
dc.subject.ocdehttps://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.04es_ES
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiones_ES
dc.type.otherArtículo
local.author.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-4511-2108


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Attribution 3.0 Unported
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution 3.0 Unported