On Collusion and Industry Size

dc.contributor.authorEscrihuela-Villar, Marc
dc.contributor.authorGuillén, Jorge
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-15T18:58:40Z
dc.date.available2023-06-15T18:58:40Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we investigate the connection between the number of competitors and the sustainability of collusion within the context of a infinitely repeated symmetric Cournot model where only a subset of firms cooperate. We show that, in our model, an increase in the number of cartel firms may increase collusion likelihood by diminishing the negative effects for collusion of the existence of a competitive fringe. Also, we show that an increase in the number of fringe firms makes collusion harder to sustain.en_EN
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationEscrihuela-Villar, M., & Guillén, J. (2011). On collusion and industry size. Annals of Economics and Finance, 12(1), 31-40.
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12640/3407
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherCEMA, Central University of Finance and Economics
dc.publisher.countryCN
dc.relation.ispartofurn:issn:1529-7373
dc.relation.urihttps://down.aefweb.net/AefArticles/aef120103.pdf
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International*
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_ES
dc.subjectCollusionen_EN
dc.subjectSustainabilityen_EN
dc.subjectFringeen_EN
dc.subjectColusiónes_ES
dc.subjectSostenibilidades_ES
dc.subjectMargenes_ES
dc.subject.ocdehttps://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.04
dc.titleOn Collusion and Industry Sizeen_EN
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.otherArtículo
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
local.author.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-4511-2108
oaire.citation.endPage40
oaire.citation.issue1
oaire.citation.startPage31
oaire.citation.titleAnnals of Economics and Finance
oaire.citation.volume12
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